The Executive

Executive Government Conventions

Conventions underpin the operation of the Canadian Constitution and the Executive Government.

A convention is an unwritten rule, an accepted practice. The Westminster parliamentary system is built around these kinds of unwritten rules.

For example, the first part of the Canadian Constitution, the Constitution Act 1867 (formerly known as the British North America Act), which was the country's founding document and sole Constitution from 1867 to 1982, makes no mention of the position of Prime Minister, or of the Cabinet. The position of Prime Minister is mentioned in the Constitution Act 1982, but not in the sense of outlining the role, powers and responsibilities of the position. There is no rule that says the Prime Minister must be a member of the House of Commons. A literal reading of the Constitution suggests that the Governor General runs the government.

Overview of the Conventions of Executive Government in Canada

A Canadian Federal ministry must fulfill a number of constitutional requirements and conventions:

1. There is a traditional expectation that members of Cabinet also sit as elected MPs. Cabinets are generally appointed from amongst the governing party's pool of MPs; should a prime minister appoint a cabinet minister from outside Parliament, it is expected that the individual acquire a seat within a reasonable time or resign. The last cabinet minister to be neither a MP nor a Senator was Brian Tobin (Liberal), who was appointed Minister of Industry several months before he won a seat in the 2000 General Election.
2. The Westminster system requires that the ministry must command the support - "confidence" - of the lower house, the House of Commons. The Lower House may indicate its lack of support for the Government by rejecting a Motion of Confidence, or by passing a Motion of No Confidence. Important bills that form a part of the Government's agenda are generally considered matters of confidence, as is the annual budget. When a Government has lost the confidence of the House of Commons, the Prime Minister is obliged to either resign, or request the Governor General to dissolve Parliament, thereby precipitating a general election. This convention is reinforced by the requirement that all appropriation bills must originate in the House of Commons. Without the ability to secure "supply" from the House of Commons, a ministry is obliged to resign or call an election. This last occurred in 1979 when the House of Commons voted on a Motion of No Confidence related to the Clark government's budget.
3. Under Section 9 of the constitution, Executive power resides in the hands of the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor General (Section 10). Section 11 stipulates that there shall be a Privy Council to advise the Governor General, who can also "from Time to Time," remove them. Section 24 allows the Governor General to appoint Senators. By convention, however, all these powers reside in the hands of the government, and specifically the Prime Minister, of the day. The Governor General, by Westminster convention, acts on the advice of ministers.
4. The principle of Collective Ministerial Responsibility applies in Canada. Cabinet meets in secret and speaks with one voice. Ministers who are not prepared to accept the collective decisions of Cabinet are expected to resign. Ministers who speak out in public against Cabinet decisions can expect to be dismissed by the Prime Minister. The most recent example of a cabinet minister resigning because they disagreed with government policy occurred in 2006, when Michael Chong (Conservative - Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs) resigned from Cabinet because of his disagreement with the government's decision to recognize "the Québécois" as a nation within a united Canada. Conversely, cabinet solidarity is not always maintained.
5. The principle of Individual Ministerial Responsibility applies in Canada. Ministers are expected to take responsibility for the administration of their departments, the actions of their staff and themselves. This principle has become increasingly difficult to interpret and enforce, given the size and complexity of modern government. Often, the political support of the Prime Minister is the most crucial factor determining whether ministers survive scrutiny and criticism of their conduct. This was evident in the survival of Human Resources Development minister Jane Stewart, in 1999, over the so-called "billion-dollar boondoggle" where poor accounting practices at HRDC left millions of dollars unaccounted for. While the problems at HRDC mostly dated from the time of her predecessor, Pierre Pettigrew, Stewart took the brunt of the attack and was considered to have handled the scandal poorly. Despite this, she did not resign, and then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stood by her throughout the ordeal.

Ministers also come under attack over conflict of interest claims. A recent example of this would be the posting of Gordon O'Connor to the position of Minister of National Defence by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006. Having campaigned on ethics and accountability issues, including particularly a promised crackdown on lobbying and reforms to lobbying legislation, O'Connor's past employment as a lobbyist for several major defence industry companies including some of the world's largest military contractors, such as General Dynamics and BAE Systems and Airbus as recently as 2004 was seen by many as peculiar since the minister wouldl be responsible for spending millions of dollars in defence procurements, and would often be dealing with the very companies for whom he advised for and assisted in soliciting defence contracts; seemingly putting him in constant peril of conflict-of-interest issues.